MUNGER AFRICANA

LIBRARY NOTES

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
Road
Railroads
Helicopter bases in the East
Indicates guerrilla movement
CABINDA
Cabinda
Congo River
Thysville
CONGO
São Salvador
ZAIRE
UIGE
Ambriz
Luanda
LUANDA
Cuanza
CUANZA NORTE
MALANGE
Cuango
Malange
LUNDA
Kasai
Henrique de Carvalho
ANGOLA
CUANZA SUL
Luando
Cuanza
Bié Plateau
Luso
Zambeze
BENGUELA
Benguela
HUAMBO
Silva Porto
Umpulo
Lungué Bungo
Nova Lisboa
BIÉ
Tempué
Cuando
Cangamba
Vila Gago Coutinho
Muié
ZAMBIA
Cubango
Sá da Bandeira
Vila Serpa Pinto
Chiume
Moçâmedes
Cassinga
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MOÇÂMEDES
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CUANDO
BAROTSELAND
CUBANGO
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M. LeB.

MUNGER AFRICANA LIBRARY NOTES

Two Dollars Issue #6 April 1971

WALKING 300 MILES WITH GUERILLAS THROUGH THE BUSH OF EASTERN ANGOLA

Basil Davidson

Introduction

Basil Davidson is a man of at least three careers -- guerilla fighter, journalist, and African historian. All of these intertwine in this account of his hazardous trek through eastern Angola in the summer of 1970.

At the age of 25, Mr. Davidson entered World War II. He served in the Balkans, North Africa, and Italy, reaching the rank of Lt. Colonel in the British Army. He was twice mentioned in despatches, and received the Military Cross, the U.S. Bronze Star, and, in 1970, a distinguished medal from the government of Yugoslavia for his courageous work with the partisans behind German lines -- an experience which has some bearing on his recent trip to Angola.

Subsequently, Mr. Davidson had a highly successful career as a journalist on the Economist, as Paris correspondent of The Times, and as special correspondent of the New Statesman, which included a trip across Angola in the 1950's. He has never lost his keen perception in reporting current events.

The author of more than twenty books of fiction and non-fiction, Mr. Davidson is best known for his numerous volumes on African history, in which he has pioneered the publicizing of the explosion of serious research on Africa. He is currently the most widely read historian on Africa. A good many of his editions, both hard cover and paperback, are being translated into an ever increasing number of foreign languages. Mr. Davidson's archeological background and his

sense of the broad sweep of history intensify his appreciation of the present.

In steady demand for university courses and seminars, Mr. Davidson has, most recently, been Regents Professor at the University of California in Los Angeles. His charming wife is a magistrate. They have three sons and make their home on the outskirts of London.

Mr. Davidson's latest Angolan adventure follows part of the path of the explorer Silva Porto. The informal remarks in this NOTE were made without a text at a small public seminar at the California Institute of Technology and are followed by questions from faculty, students, and visitors. Mr. Davidson has not edited his spoken comments.

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Thank you very much. My wife and I would like to say that we are extremely happy to be here. I am told that you are interested in hearing about conditions in guerilla areas in Angola and questions related to that. I think that the easiest thing would be to go over questions and answers later on, because I am not certain where your precise interests lie, and it will be much easier for me to talk extensively, or anyway as extensively as you can bear, if we have a few leading questions.

However, I'd like to begin by talking a little bit about the background to this kind of exercise. There is no need for me to embark upon the political background in Angola, but the wars began in 1961 and they are continued to this day. The only solid measure I think that we have of the scale and intensity of the fighting is from Portuguese sources, since one should rightly suspect all other sources as being subjective. Now, according to Portuguese statistics, the number of clashes between the Portuguese army, the Portuguese militia and soldiers, and the guerillas increased by about 60% in 1970 over 1968 and 1969. 1968 was once again a high point. It is very clear that this is a major guerilla war. Another measure one has is the size of the Portuguese armed forces. One doesn't know that exactly, but one knows it more or less to the nearest 5,000, I think, and the size of these forces has continued to rise up to 1968-69. It did not rise in 1970, probably because it is now becoming extremely difficult for the Portuguese to increase the size of their forces, and the best that they can do with their new intake is to replace existing conscripts. The Portuguese have probably got something on the order of 50,000 to 60,000 metropolitan troops, I would guess, in Angola. Apart from that, they have mobilized an unknown number of settlers, probably 5,000 to 10,000, and, in addition, they have mobilized a large number of Africans, in the order of 20,000. So you are getting near 100,000 for the total armed forces on the Portuguese side as against about 6,000 in 1960. This is the scale of the thing on the Portuguese side. The 20,000-odd figure is not exact, but it is of that order -- African troops and Portuguese soldiers in Angola. Of these, it seems that about a quarter are volunteers -- or are said to be volunteers -- and three-quarters are conscripts. It is extremely difficult to know the truth about that, but my source there is a South African journalist named Venter who wrote an extremely useful book called The Terror Fighters. * It was published in the middle of 1969 and is based on his experiences at the end of 1968 and the beginning of 1969, with the

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*Venter, Al J., The Terror Fighters -- a Profile of Guerilla Warfare in Southern Africa, Purnell, Cape Town, 1969.

Portuguese in Angola. In this book, which is very well done, Venter quotes Portuguese sources very extensively, and I think it is the best source of information, other than such as we have from Portuguese reporting, on the European side in Angola.

A certain number of things have been obvious to those of us who have followed this affair since the beginning. The main rising began in the north, north of the Cuanza, north of Luanda, and continued through the beginning of 1961. From March until September 1961, it was very clear that the Portuguese had lost control of practically the whole of Uige, Cuanza Norte, and Zaire -- districts which compose that salient in the north. The Portuguese regained control effectively in 1962-63, and in 1963 it looks as though the war is practically over. It looks as though it is practically over because the guerillas, based on the western Congo -- or what is called Leopoldville-Kinshasa now -- have established themselves securely in Leopoldville-Kinshasa, building up a small army. But they have a very small base inside the country and seem, in 1963, incapable of extending that base. It looks as though the Portuguese have stabilized the situation and regained control of practically the whole of the north, but for one or two pockets of resistance in the deep rainfall district that is found there. In the rest of the country practically nothing happened. So, in 1963, it appears that the thing is finished.

However, it isn't finished. In 1964, operations are begun by the MPLA* based in Brazzaville in the Cabinda enclave. They are extremely successful to begin with, but they don't maintain their level of success. In any case, Cabinda is cut off from Angola by the western Congo. On the other hand, by 1965-66, the events start shifting, and guerilla movements start coming in from Zambia, which had become independent in 1964. One watched all that with interest and some surprise that even in 1965-66 the drive of the guerilla movements was not expended, was evidently beginning again, and one waited to see how far it would go. And quite clearly by 1968 these events in the east -- that is to say, mainly in the Moxico district, between the railway, partly in Cuando-Cubango, and in southern Lunda near the Kasai River -- indicated that a considerable amount of guerilla activity had begun again. Portuguese and South African reports made this very clear. The guerillas also put out their claims, and certain conclusions could be made by comparing the two.

And I, myself -- since I am talking partly about myself

*MPLA -- Movimento Popular de Libertaçao de Angola.

-- came to the conclusion at the end of 1968 that the time had come to have a look, since one can only really convince one's self in guerilla situations if one goes to have a look, if one can, or if somebody goes in whom one has confidence. I meant to go in June 1969, but various things not connected with this problem at all prevented me from going then. But eventually I went last summer. The object of going there was to find out if possible the answer to two main questions. First, what was the guerilla situation in the east which by this time was clearly the main theater of guerilla operations? Secondly, who were responsible for these operations as between the two claimants, UNITA*, founded by Jonas Savimbi in the end of 1965 and the beginning of '66, and the MPLA, the old MPLA, which was founded in 1956, but was reformed in 1962-63 in Brazzaville by Agostinho Neto? Both claim to be the major guerilla movement in the east and both wrote extremely convincing communiques. From the communiques it really was impossible to say who was telling the truth and who wasn't. It seemed important from the standpoint of my interests, which are concerned with the history of these movements, to know exactly what was going on at a point and in a period where major guerilla activity had revived in 1967 and had achieved a high point in 1969, as far as I could tell. And continued, as we now know, to an even higher point in 1970.

These, then, were the two reasons: What was the situation there and who was responsible for it? One might ask why not, therefore, go to the north, since the north continued to be a scene of activity? And the answer to me was very clear that even though guerilla actions were continued in the north, both by the MPLA and the UPA**, which were based in an area roughly around Ambriz in the northwest, they had not been capable of breaking out onto a wider front. Although they were an extreme annoyance to the Portuguese, they were not, in fact, expanding. The main point, of course, is that this area of Huila, Huambo, Bié, and Malange is the crucial area from the standpoint of the war. That is where the heart of Portuguese settlement is and that is where the guerillas must become effective if they are going to be more than a longterm nuisance. It is only when guerilla movements get into this area that they will be able seriously to undermine the foundations of Portuguese settlement, of Portuguese communications, of Portuguese economy, and, of course, to have access down the watershed to the coast. The questions, therefore, one has to ask -- and this is really an intelligence problem -- are: What is the situation there and who is getting into it? If they are not getting into it, why aren't they? And if they are, who are they, and where are they coming

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*União Nacional para a Independência total de Angola.

**União das Populações de Angola.

from? These are obviously the first questions that one has to ask. And it is very obvious, from all the evidence assembled, that the activity is not happening in this direction. There is so far as we know no activity south of the Luando-Cuanza River. These guerilla units, whether MPLA or UPA, have not succeeded in doing more than survive. Consequently, they're interesting, but they are not likely to be decisive.

On the other hand, the situation in the east was manifestly by 1968, and confirmed in 1969, very different. Here you had the beginning of guerilla activity in 1965 and '66, across the Zambian frontier, whether from the western region into Villa Luso or to the Cuando River and beyond. And it was very clear from Portuguese communiques in 1969 that actions were being fought in the western part of this eastern region. This answered the question as to whether or not this is an expanding area of activity. The guerillas were claiming in 1969 to have got as far as the Cuanza into the plateau of Bié -- in other words, into the foothills of the central area and on the edge of getting across the Cuanza into Huambo. If they were able to do that, if they <u>are</u> able to do that, then, of course, they have undoubtedly scored a major point. So it seemed very obvious that one should go to the east and not to the north. That answered the first problem, since the attack on the central area is coming from the east. And the attack seemed to be successful, or anyway to have some limited success. Similarly, it was coming around into Malange, or so it was claimed.

Now, the next question that needed answering -- and this again is an intelligence problem -- was where do you go? Unless you have got about nine months to spend (and in the nature of things you haven't), you have to select an area. The country is very large; it is 480,000 square miles, which is almost as large as Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, and California combined. It is very, very large, indeed. It took old Silva Porto back in the 1850's, '60's, and '70's -- he was settled in a place which was then near Nova Lisboa -- Silva Porto used to go on trading journeys into the Barotse area as far as the Zambezi. And it used to take him seven weeks each way to do that, during peacetime, along trails well known, and not held up at all. It takes the guerillas, they say, about six weeks to march from the frontier of Zambia to the Cuanza River, and that is marching seven days a week and fairly hard. So if you wish to go to the Cuanza and back and see anything and spend any time there, you are into about four months.

I had about two months, rather less than two, available, and so I just picked an area which seemed to me to be decisive from

two standpoints. First of all, one has to ask what is happening in the base area near the frontier one personally has access to and who has the strategic initiative in that area? -- strategic initiative being the overall command from month-to-month, the side which dictates the month-to-month situation. Secondly, is this area being used for onward passage into Huila, Bié, Huambo, and possibly across the railway into Malange? There again if one wanted to have the full answer to that question, one would obviously have to be in the area for many, many weeks, and possibly for many, many months. But it seemed to me that if there were an area which was decisive and about which one could draw some conclusions which had a general value, it must be the area which lies between the River Lungué Bungo and the Cuando -- in other words, central Moxico. So I decided to go there if I could, and I selected a place which was exactly 100 miles on a latitude from the Zambian frontier, a place called Muié, which is about 105 miles on a latitude. Well, you don't march on a latitude, that is very obvious, and so I crossed the Zambian frontier at Point A (which I am not at liberty to reveal), and I marched on a wide circuit to Muié and back on another wide circuit to the frontier, and that was about 320 miles, which is about as much as I was capable of doing.

Now, it was enough, I think, to draw some fairly detailed conclusions about that area -- the area lying between the Lungué Bungo and the Cuando, and, indeed, across the Cuando into Cuando Cubango. I think I know exactly what was going on there as of last July, and things have not substantially changed. Two things are very clear. First of all, this is an area in which the MPLA uniquely exists. There is no evidence of the UNITA having any existence in that area at all, although it had such an existence in 1965 and early 1966. It seems that UNITA still does have a presence in Angola, and I guess they are operating north of the Lungué Bungo and that they do have some base in the area. Savimbi, himself, is the Ovimbundu of the principal people of the Bié Plateau. But, of course, they are obviously a movement of secondary importance at this stage. This is what all the Portuguese and South African reports confirm. Secondly, it is quite clear that the MPLA in that area have the strategic initiative over the Portuguese. And thirdly it also seems quite clear to me from evidence that I saw and heard that they are using that broad area for access to the Cuanza River and onwards to Huambo. Those are the broad conclusions I drew upon the basis of marching in that area last summer.

Apart from those conclusions, which were valuable to me because they answered certain questions that I had in mind, they put the movements in, I think, a factual perspective. They enabled one to be satisfied that one knew the answer to these questions, and

they enabled one to see the Portuguese situation pretty clearly. Guerilla war is not the slightest bit like regular warfare. It is a strange, illusive, and misleading business. But if you are somewhat accustomed to it, it is just the same wherever it takes place, whether it is in Europe in the Second World War, or whether it is in Africa. I don't think anything has changed there; I don't think that anybody has invented anything new, except that the weapons are now more effective and dangerous than they used to be in our old-fashioned medieval war before 1945. I found, for instance, that most of the guerillas were armed, and most of their arms are coming from, or were coming from, the Russians. In fact, I would say that up to last summer, I should think at least 70 - 80% of their imported arms supply -- they are getting some inside, of course, from the Portuguese and borrow from the African militia -- but I should think that 70 - 80% are coming from the Soviet Union, or possibly the Soviet Union and one or two satellite countries, such as Czechoslovakia. Now, they are supplying these weapons because all guerilla movements at a certain point in time must have access to weapons from outside, since the guerillas are not going to be able to capture them. This was true of all the insurrection movements in Europe in the Second World War, and I think it is a general rule in this business. There comes a point at which guerillas need to be supplied with sophisticated weapons which they cannot capture. And they cannot capture them because their capture would mean assaults on garrisons which would either tend to destroy the weapons or, at this state of events, would be too costly for the guerillas to embark upon. However, what they are getting from the Russians, I must say, isn't very good. They are getting a few modern automatics like Kalashanikovs*, which is a good automatic. But I saw an awful lot of Schmeisser submachine guns, which is the kind of submachine gun that we thought highly of in 1944. I had one, myself, at that time. And it fired extremely well and without choking for a range of about 200 - 250 yards. But Kalashanikovs, like NATO's modern automatics, are going to 600 - 650 yards. Consequently, in ambush work it is not a useful weapon. And the difficulty which the guerillas have been having is particularly in ambush work, since the Portuguese now have been driven back to heavily armed convoys, moving under protection of heavy automatics, usually with the forest cut down on either side, always in 4, 5, 6 heavy trucks. And it is extremely difficult to attack them unless you have weapons that are effective over about half a mile. The guerillas at this stage of events are still extremely poorly armed in all automatics. They have very few machine guns. I was astonished to see an old Browning machine gun, and I was very happy that they

*A submachine gun which is a Russian version of the Chinese AK47, having an accurate range of about 800 meters.

didn't have to fire it when I was present, because I can't think what would have happened to it.

They are not well armed at all, but they are extremely well organized. The organization of guerilla units is standard, I think. It starts off here as it does elsewhere with the infiltration of a small number of armed fighters from outside -- 200 or 300 -- coming across the Zambian frontier in 1966. The first stage of the operations is for these men to root their cause and themselves into the rural setup. This proved successful, and the next step was to start mobilizing men as local guerillas. This also proved successful, so that in 1970 it was very evident that the peoples living in that area, mostly Mbundu, Luchazi, Chokwe -- in the past in the literature you will find them mentioned under the term Ganguella, which is a catch-all term which the Ovimbundu applied to the peoples of the east. The term was taken over by the Portuguese and is regarded by the peoples of the east as pejorative. They don't like being called Ganguella. But they are effectively people speaking the Simbundu group of languages -- Mbundu, Luchazi, etc., who have been in this area for as long as we know and certainly since the 16th century -- these people are now the movement in this area. The escorteur with which I moved (and I was the only visitor) consisted of about a dozen Lunda-Mbunda [?], some Luchazi, one Bushman, one Ovimbundu, one Kimbundu, and two Métis who had come from another area -- one was a doctor and the other was a photographer. In other words, in this area another claim of the MPLA can be tested: Has it broken out of its old ethnic narrowness of the late 1950's and early 1960's, when it was based effectively upon the Kimbun around Luanda and other people inside Luanda? And very clearly, it has done so. This is now as near to being a national movement as one can find. In this respect the MPLA is once again an interesting comparison with the UPA, since the UPA has not succeeded in breaking out of its BaKongo ethnic exclusiveness.

In the area I saw myself, there are many rivers and they nearly all flow from the west to the east. They either flow into the Zambezi, or into the Cuando, one or the other, or they're tributaries off tributaries. But they are flowing from the west to the east. The country is flat, climbing slowly to the foothills of Bié, and on either side of the rivers is a more or less broad open space of grassland called "shana" in Portuguese, almost a marsh. In between is woodland, sparse woodland which is not particularly dense and not very good cover from the air. That is the terrain. The Mbunda in the past lived along these "shana," along these river banks in villages nicely placed where they were able to cultivate at the edge of the forest

mainly manioc and millet. They could fish in the rivers, they are very good fishermen. They have now retreated from these villages under the pressure of the war into the woodlands between the rivers. They must have been well fed, and they must have had a well-balanced ecology in the past, so far as one can see. They have lots of fish, the country is full of game, they are able to cultivate well, the soil is light, but it grows perfectly good manioc, millet, and maize. They have plenty of honey, the woods are full of honey. I saw for the first time this bird that seeks the honey. I always thought it was a myth, this honey seeker that pipes. Do you know about the honey seeker? You hear it in the mornings when you prepare to march. It sits in a tree and it calls. Its object is to lead you to a beehive, which is going to be in the woods. I thought this is one of those nice stories about Africa, you know, that isn't true. But in fact, it is true. Its interest is the grubs, the larvae, of the bees, and they can't get at those, so you open up the hive and take the honey, and it shares out. That is the principle of the thing, anyway, but it really does do that. Anyway, they have plenty of honey, and they are rather a well-fed people traditionally. They are living badly now because of the pressures of the war, but there is plenty of food if they can get it.

The war is a war for people and not for territory. This is true of all guerilla wars. They are not concerned with territory but rather with people. Guerillas have no interest in occupying, or remaining in occupation of, any particular piece of land, except in relationship to the population which happens to be there. So the organization of these guerillas is much as you would expect. There are a certain number of detachments of about an average size of 25 placed at certain points in order to control access along the rivers, in order to control bush paths, and in order to protect groups of the civilian population who have taken refuge in the woodlands and whose sons are the rank and file of the guerilla units. The Portuguese are established in a number of fixed points. Their strategy shifted after 1968. They didn't take this eastern business at all seriously until '68, but then they began to take it seriously. They determined on a strategy which they announced (that is how we know it) which was to increase the number of their fixed garrisons and to use these fixed garrisons for two purposes. One was to round up as many of the local population as they could into strategic hamlets, which they called "Peace Villages," or "sanzalas du pais," behind barbed wire, a sort of concentration camp.* The other was to use these fixed points as sources for strong armed ground patrols aimed at pushing guerillas out of the points that

*The term was first used in the "Boer" War by the British who "concentrated" the Afrikaner families.

they were occupying when those points were important for the control of population. They did do this and they have in the area that I saw about eight garrisons with about 100 - 200 men in each. And they said, "We will contain the eastern threat like this and we will recover strategic initiative by a combination of the occupation of strategic points and strong ground patrols, and we will build a strategic barrier east of the Cuanza, which will prevent the guerillas from penetrating into Bié, into the central area which is Bié, Huambo, and Malange." This was 1968, and they set about this in rather good style. They had a lot of initial success, and in the summer of '68 they began using helicopters with commandos in eastern Angola for the first time on any scale, and they used them with extreme effectiveness. They undoubtedly hit the guerillas very hard. This is clear from the evidence, and the guerillas themselves admit it. Of course, the helicopter is a very difficult weapon to deal with. The helicopters are based in Luanda with the commandos, marines, and other elite units who are used in helicopter operations and who seem to be several thousand strong -- I can't give you a better figure than that, but it seems to be smaller than five and bigger than two. They have in the east three main helicopter bases. One is in Henrique de Carvalho, which is in Lunda; one is in Gago Coutinho, which is in Moxico; and one is at Cuito Cuanavale. And so they are bringing their helicopters to one of these three areas and they are using these areas as bases for "nomadization" -- that is the phrase they use for combined commando operations.

These combined commando operations started in 1968, and they were effective because the guerillas had never had any experience with helicopters before. I don't know whether any of you have had any experience with helicopters, but it is a disagreeable experience. Fortunately, we didn't have any in the Second World War. If we had had any, I seriously wonder if even the Yugoslav partisans could have done what they did. Because the helicopter doesn't fly very fast, but it flies very low. And the amount of warning you get is very small, indeed, maybe not more than a minute or two. And it hovers. If you are in a situation without much cover, you really have just about had it. It is very disconcerting, and it is psychologically very disturbing. It hit them hard, and they took a bad knock. The Portuguese announced, as is always the case on these occasions -- the Germans used to do it regularly, every three months -- that everybody had been eliminated and the war was practically over. I, myself, have been eliminated not less than three times in that way.

Well, it didn't happen, of course. What happened was that the guerillas learned the lesson. They had begun to operate from the static bases inside, they had begun to have too many people at these

static bases, they had begun to become careless, they had begun to show themselves during the day, they had begun to go on bathing expeditions, which are very pleasant in guerilla life, and so on and so forth. They had, in the middle of 1968, a big political conference there, which helped them in the wake of this rather appalling offensive. So at the end of 1968 they reformed their strategy in obvious ways, and they began to recover. There is no doubt that by 1970 they had more than recovered their position, both as to the control of strategic initiative and as to use of that area for further movement into Bié. And they claimed in 1970 -- and I would believe it on the basis of Portuguese reports as well, even though this is hearsay as far as I am concerned -- they claimed to be operating already west of the Cuanza. Once again, according to Portuguese reports, there isn't any doubt that they are already operating around Serpa Pinto. So the drive is coming around in three prongs. That appears to be the situation at the moment.

The effective fighting units are still weak, but there is no doubt that they are there. The problem, of course, is one of supply. The supplies come from Dar es Salaam into Zambia to the frontier, and when they get to the frontier, they have to be carried by foot, or on people's backs until they arrive. This, of course, is slow, inefficient, and a tiresome business. But the fact that it can be done, and it is being done, is one more piece of evidence of the effectiveness with which the MPLA is operating in that central area. Since, unless you control the territory fairly well from week to week, you will not in fact be able to risk sending columns which, although armed, are so heavily laden that they are not able to operate. No guerilla unit can operate without extreme mobility, and the whole object of these columns that go in is to avoid contact with the enemy and to march through woodland paths for as many weeks as may be necessary. This would not be possible, in my judgment, were there not for over all control. It doesn't mean that they have a tactical initiative all the time. Whenever the Portuguese bring in their helicopters -- and I saw this myself last summer on two or three occasions. I didn't see any helicopters fortunately and they didn't see me, but they were bringing them down round about -- whenever this mobilization goes on, what happens is the Portuguese put down two, three, or four helicopter loads of commandos in an open space and take off and go back to Gago Continho or to Cuito Cuanavale. The commando marches on its ordered line from A to B, and this will take a week or ten days. From A to B the line has tactical initiative all along the route, unless the guerillas feel strong enough to, or feel inclined to, or are shoved into attacking the commando unit, which normally they don't do, and indeed on guerilla

lines, ought not to do. They simply leave these people to march. They stand them off from villages that they are protecting or they evacuate these villages off the line of march. After about ten days -- it is very seldom more than ten, so far as I know -- they call down the helicopters again and off they go back to Luanda. And the situation reverts to what it was before. In other words, the strategic initiative is solidly held, or was solidly held last summer, by the guerillas whose tactical initiative is exercised by the Portuguese whenever they bring in these patrols.

It is very difficult to know how far South African and Rhodesian helicopters are being used. The guerillas say, but I have no evidence, that Cuito Cuanavale is being used by both South African and Rhodesian air forces, mainly for a helicopter base. And the MPLA did shoot down one helicopter in 1968 which certainly had a Rhodesian pilot, because they got his papers. But the evidence for South African involvement is not there. It seems to be quite likely that the South African air force will, in fact, be having a look from time to time, but probably no more than that. And so far the Portuguese do not have enough helicopters, do not have enough elite troops, good troops, to do more than exercise these limited tactical initiatives. And so long as that is the case (and even, I think, if it were not the case), the present situation would continue. So long as the supplies can go on coming in and can go on being marched into the center of the country, so long will the penetration be made good. And it would seem that it will not be long before the guerillas reach the head of the Moçâmedes Railway, Cassinga, and the iron ore. The so-called barrier has not functioned, and the Portuguese have not been successful in keeping the guerilla units out of that central area. So far there seems to be no connection between guerilla units in the west and guerilla units in the north. There appears to be no link there, but one supposes that this will eventually, perhaps within the next year or so, be achieved.

That seems to have covered the main points. One marches, fortunately, during the day. I was surprised and happy to hear that, because I am reaching an age when marching during the night is particularly unpleasant. We crossed the frontier during the day both ways, marched during the day, crossed the rivers during the day, even swam the rivers during the day, to my amazement and, I must say, I was slightly apprehensive. When you are stark naked in the middle of an Angolan river, and the chance of helicopters arriving, it is rather worse than not being stark naked.

Q: At least you could see the crocodiles.

A: They have been won over. Except the hippopotamuses have not. It is said that the hippos on the upper Zambezi are extremely hostile. They are pro-Portuguese. They do, in fact, upset canoes. I didn't cross the upper Zambezi -- the part north of the confluence of the Lungué Bungo, and this of course is an area of access into Lunda, into Moxico, and so on into Lunda across the railway. The guerillas are not blowing up the railway by agreement with the Zambian government, but there isn't any doubt, from other evidence, that they control most of the railway east of Luso. Luso, now elevated from Villa Luso to being the capital town, is the logistic headquarters, and I think the Army Command headquarters of the Portuguese in the east, although they appear to be much dispersed, notably since 1968, when they began to rely upon this helicopter stuff. Their main base is now at Gago Coutinho, and it is perfectly easy during the day to cross the frontier anywhere down there that you want to. And we did do that, and marched to Muié. It is very difficult to prove that you have been to a place, and I don't know that I actually can, but I am prepared to answer questions on what Muié looks like. And please be as skeptical as you like. My whole attitude in these affairs is always one of extreme skepticism. Although I am inclined temperamentally to be optimistic and very confiding, nonetheless I teach myself great skepticism, and I don't believe anything that I haven't been able to test, so far as one can test these things. So please turn back on me, if you feel inclined to do it, the skepticism which I turned upon them before I went there.

Q: You said that roughly three-fourths of the Portuguese metropolitan troops were conscripts?

A: No. All the Portuguese troops are conscripts, with the exception of a very tiny minority who are volunteers. Of the Africans fighting in Angola on the Portuguese side, according to Venter (he is my only source), three-fourths are conscripts.

Q: What is the attitude of the metropolitan Portuguese towards the whole war in Angola?

A: Well, I can't tell you that, because I was uniquely on the guerilla side. One can only draw conclusions indirectly from such evidence as we have. So far as operations go, I was concerned to avoid contact with the Portuguese, I wasn't concerned to be a guerilla. But you can't make this kind of tour without having some indirect contact with an enemy established like that because you are infiltrating all the time between fixed points, you are crossing roads back and

forth, roads which the Portuguese aim to hold and fail. As far as I could see, their morale is not good. If their morale had been good, they would have made it much more difficult. Or especially as, when I was in Muié -- which was the farthest west, about 160 miles from home as it were -- they began to chase our group on the grounds that they had received intelligence from peasants they had captured (vastly exaggerated, no doubt) that important foreigners, and so on, were there. Well, there was only one foreigner, and he wasn't important; anyway, he was doing his very best not to seem so. And they began to push a little bit to see if they could catch up with us, and they failed, they failed completely. My judgment was that they didn't try very hard. I think that if they had known their business and meant it, we should have had to run a great deal harder than we did, which was fortunate for me. That is the kind of subjective evidence which I don't think is worth a great deal.

Much more interesting is the state of mind in Portugal, itself, where you have authenticated and illegal immigration to the common market countries, mainly to France and to western Germany, of very large numbers of Portuguese who may, over the last ten years, total some 5% of the total population. There are said to be more Portuguese living in France than in the city of Oporto. This is very convincing, indeed. You get occasional deserters from the army who are prepared to make statements against the war. A couple of Portuguese junior officers did that in Brussels only a couple of months ago, but they are rare. However, there is a massive draft dodging operation going on which affects tens of thousands of young men, and of this I think there isn't the slightest doubt. I don't know how far one can say anymore in answer to your question. It is very difficult to know. The morale of some of the commandos seems to be much better. They marched very hard. They put down a helicopter commando team about ten miles from where I was at one point, and they marched very hard, I must say. They seemed to be fairly determined. But there were very few of them, there were only about 15 or 20, and they did no more than march from A to B and mind their step as they went. They were in no sense a threat, since it was extremely easy to evade them; and it was also, as it proved, easy to stand them off, easy to hold them back. But I think their morale probably is quite good. The morale of the average Portuguese and the morale of the African troops is abysmal. It is very poor, indeed, as you would expect it to be. For what are they getting out of the war, after all?

Q: These Peace Villages that you speak of, did they evacuate everyone from the surrounding areas and put them in these villages or just certain groups?

A: Well, they attempt to corral the whole population. It is very difficult to know the proportions, but they claim to have got 70% of the population of Moxico, which is a vast area running up the railway to the frontier of Katanga, right down to the Cuando, and up the Cuando to about the frontier of Bié. They claim to have got about 70% of that area in the "sanzalas du pais," in the concentrated villages. I think that must be a vastly exaggerated figure. Judging from what I could find in this area, which I think is a crucial area, about one-third of the population there has fled into Zambia, about one-third is in the woods with the guerillas, and about one-third is concentrated behind barbed wire. This is how I would see it. Therefore, the Portuguese may have about half of the surviving population.

Now, how do they live? Well, once again, this was another of the objects for going to Muié. Muié is a very small bush village, a fourth-class town in Portuguese classification. And a fourth-class town on close investigation isn't much of a town. It has a garrison of about 150, of which about 50 or 60 are metropolitan Portuguese. It is behind a rectangle of barbed wire, with about nine to eleven timber-built watchguard towers about twelve feet high and some search lights for use at night. The bush is cut back for about 200 or 300 meters around the wire. Inside the wire is the garrison, and inside the wire are the concentrated Africans from that area. I was able to talk to a number of Mbunda who had escaped from Muié. Muié does not appear far away when you look at a map, but I can assure you, it is singularly far if you go to walk it. It is fairly characteristic of these little posts in the bush of which there are two or three dozen in that area. But the people who escaped said, yes, they were rounded up, by force (that is obvious). And how do they live? They live very badly. Why? Because there is no food. Why is there no food? Because Muié is supplied from Cangamba. There is a bush road that goes there, off the main road to Gago Coutinho, Cangamba, and on to Silva Porto and Nova Lisboa. Now, that is all woodland area, and it is ambushed regularly by the guerillas. So the Portuguese can get supplies through to Muié only when they are able to assemble a heavily strong convoy. And, given their resources, they are not able to assemble a strong convoy very often, probably not more than once a month. They have to supply not only their troops, and their troops' dependents, the troops' women, and all the rest of it, which is going to be 300 - 400 people, but they have also got to supply the people behind the barbed wire -- the Africans whom they rounded up, who could number up to 1500 or 2000 even. These 1500 - 2000 people are supposed, in principle, to grow their own food. They are regrouped in villages, they are supposed to have a school, they are supposed to have a clinic, they are supposed to have lots of advantages, and they are supposed to go out into the fields

to cultivate their food and so feed themselves, etc., etc. That is exactly what they can't do, or what the Portuguese can allow them to do only with great reluctance, since once the people get out beyond the 200 or 300 meters of cut-back forest, they run off into the woodlands. And they did run off into the woodlands when we were in the vicinity of Muié, about two hours march away, and it was the recapture of some of those that caused a certain amount of neat footwork on the part of yours truly. I talked to these people who had escaped and they said, yes, we live very badly because we are very hungry.

The point is, they are being protected, not from the terrorists, but from their brothers, their husbands, their uncles, their families. They are the same people. They are the people of the area who supply (a) the rank and file of the guerillas, and (b) the cultivators. Clearly, they are not very eager to be concentrated behind barbed wire in order to be saved from the threat of terrorism by their own families. Broadly speaking, it is very clear, and this is also the conclusion one can reach from the Portuguese evidence, that the whole policy of strategic villages has lamentably failed from the Portuguese point of view. First of all, because it has not destroyed the loyalty of the mass of the population for the guerilla cause, but rather it has deepened that loyalty as the sufferings of the people increase in these villages. Secondly, it has not succeeded in isolating people in those villages from the guerillas. There is a constant procedure of escape and recapture, escape and recapture, all the time going on. The history of strategic hamlets in guerilla warfare bears out this strong statement. It was a tactic invented by the British army in Malaya fifteen or twenty years ago. Now, the British got the better of the guerillas in Malaya for the simple reason that they were nearly all Chinese. But of course this was blared over and success in getting at the guerillas was contributed to the strategy -- the wisdom and strategy of the British government, you know -- which invented the policy of strategic hamlets, in which the Malayans were isolated from the Chinese guerillas. It succeeded because the bulk of Malayans as far as I know, were not prepared to support the Chinese guerillas. They wouldn't have escaped from the concentration camps to their husbands and relatives; they would have escaped to the Chinese. This, of course, has generally been forgotten, the policy has been taken over elsewhere, and it has been taken over by the Portuguese without taking account of this fact. If it were the case that the guerillas were simply a group of intrusive terrorists, or above all, another ethnic group, or if they were Chinese, as they are sometimes alleged to be, or if they were something else, then the policy of concentrating ethnic groups in strategic camps would probably work. It hasn't worked in this case because the guerillas are not Chinese. They are Mbundu, Chazi,

Chokwe, etc. And it doesn't work.

Q: Wasn't one of the purposes of the British isolating the villages in Malaya supposed to be to starve out the guerillas by not letting them have any food?

A: It is the extension of the same argument. Because the British didn't concentrate all those people. Those who were left didn't, on the whole, support the Chinese, and, therefore, didn't supply them with food. Now what happens in Angola is that you move from one guerilla unit's area to another one -- maybe you are marching 6, 8, or 10 hours a day -- and you march from one to the other from one day to the next. And each unit is where it is in order to protect a certain number of civilian villages in the woodlands -- they call them "kimbos" -- and prevent the Portuguese from getting at them. Now, the people in these "kimbos" are supplying their guerillas with food, because they see the guerilla cause as being their own. This is mainly what has defeated the policy. It defeated it in Guinea Bissau, it is defeating it here, and I think also in Northern Mozambique, though on that my information is not so good. Moreover, life in these strategic villages is not really pleasant, even if there were enough food. The people are there, they are allowed out only under armed guard. If they run for it, they will be shot at, and are shot at. They have got to be back before dusk. They are cut off from their families. This is not a pleasant life at all. Even if the Portuguese army were filled with sweetness and light, but, like most armies, it is not particularly filled with sweetness and light, and tends to behave with a singularly heavy hand as far as one can tell.

Q: The choice of weapons being supplied to the guerillas interests me. You mentioned the Schmeisser as being a better weapon. Is this in any way related to the AK47?

A: No, that is a misunderstanding. The Schmeisser is a German submachine gun of the Second World War, and was then a very good submachine gun, but rather heavy to carry. It is now long since obsolete. No army uses it.

Q: I was wondering what sort of weaponry is being supplied?

A: The AK47 is an automatic rifle, and a very good one, too, made by the Chinese and modeled on a somewhat heavier Russian one, the Kalashanikov rifle. They have a few of those, but not very many. There are four crucial weapons. One is a good submachine gun which will carry as far as your area submachine gun will carry -- that means

600 yards. If you are getting your weapons from the Russians, that has to be a Kalashanikov. The next important weapon is a machine gun which will carry at least a mile. You need the best one you can get because its sighting is going to be superior to the Second World War weapons. The third crucial weapon is a middle-caliber mortar, which is going to be about 82 millimeters, and that is what the Russians have and supply in small quantity. And the fourth is going to be a recoilless cannon, which is a 75 millimeter weapon. All of these are being used in Guinea Bissau and, I should say, that the war in Guinea Bissau is about two years further on in that kind of development. According to the latest reports, they now have ground to ground missiles which are effective for about 10 kilometers.

Q: Similar to the ones being used in Viet Nam?

A: I suppose so. I have never seen these myself. I am talking about Guinea Bissau at the moment, because there are no such weapons in Angola. If you can achieve adequate supplies of those four weapons and variants --

Q: Would you include land mines?

A: Oh, yes, I'm sorry, I'm taking them rather for granted, but they are very significant, indeed. You must have adequate land mines, and it is quite true, you can't capture land mines. It is against the nature of things, very difficult to capture. You would have to say five crucial weapons, then. You need an adequate supply of land mines and the other four.

Now, the guerillas are rather good at demolitions, I must say. There is a road which runs between Gago Coutinho and a place called Chiume, about 30 miles west of the Zambian frontier, north-south. This was a road which you have to cross in any case marching into the country, and I crossed it both ways. They were carrying out a rather good demolition operation when I was there, and they blew up five trucks. They blew them up with rather well-conceived charges. I didn't see them, but the charges were obviously put together very well, indeed, by men who had been trained in the work, and they were effective. But they could not be effective unless they had supplies of plastique -- I imagine it is plastique -- from outside. So that you have got to have steady supplies of these things beyond a certain point. You can't make much progress otherwise.

Q: Is this another one of those arrangements where the Russians supply the material arms and the Chinese supply the political

organization and military training? You mention trained outside demolitions men. I saw an article which referred to one of their head demolition chemists getting himself blown up inadvertently.

A: Nobody outside can supply the political organization. You have to put right out of your mind any notion that anybody else can organize guerillas.

Q: But the model of organization would be different to an extent depending upon whether it is a Chinese-tending model or a Russian-tending model?

A: I don't think so. I think that this is a complete misunderstanding of how guerilla warfare can take shape. The model has to be indigenous. Guerillas are volunteers, and therefore it follows naturally that the command structure has to be extremely diffuse. Unless you can build a model which is integrated with the local situation, you won't be able to succeed. Nobody is providing political organization except the Angolans. The Chinese up to now have provided nothing directly to these movements, certainly not to the MPLA, and I think not to UNITA, which constantly complains of not having any weapons. And certainly not to Holden Roberto , at least since 1963, to the UPA. There are a few Chinese weapons to be seen -- bazookas, a few AK47s on the Chinese pattern -- these come to the liberation committee and are distributed.

Q: Are these essentially cast-off arms?

A: Most of them, not all of them. I found it very surprising that they were not in fact doing more. The rate of supply, at least up to last July (it may have changed since then) I would say was surprisingly minimal. And that was another reason why I went. I wanted to satisfy myself on the rate and nature of supply of arms. There is no Chinese supply at all, although this may have changed since July. The reason why there was no Chinese supply to the MPLA is because the Chinese have assiduously boycotted all movements which have received supplies from the Russians. This is half true of Frelimo.* The reason that it is only half true of Frelimo is that Julius Nyerere has insisted that the Chinese should supply weapons for Frelimo, and so they get them through the Tanzanian government. Otherwise the MPLA up to last summer had nothing, though I think there is some reason to think that the Chinese may be shifting their line on this. But the surprising

*Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Mozambique Liberation Front).

thing -- and this you must bear in mind as being the most interesting piece of evidence of all -- is the absence of any foreign organizers of any nationality. I think one could argue that theoretically very easily, but it happens to be the fact on the ground. Secondly, the relative paucity of supplies is astonishing. I would have thought that they would have really pushed hard here, because they could exploit success. But, no, they haven't done it.

Q: John Marcum* appears to argue in his books that the opening up of eastern Angola has given relative advantage to SWAPO**, that they tend to use similar routes or infiltrate fighting in South West Africa through the Angolan frontier. That would imply that the South Africans would be crazy not to be working hand in hand with the Portuguese in that area. What was your observation on that?

A: I don't think that SWAPO is doing much in that direction. There is no doubt that in 1965 -- Marcum's book ends effectively at the end of 1962, but he may have subsequent information -- but SWAPO was working with UNITA in '65 and seems to have had a go at getting in this way. However, it was very difficult to do and I don't even know how far they succeeded in doing it.

Q: Haven't South African helicopters used Shakawe in Botswana very close to the Caprivi Strip at its western end?

A: It seems the South Africans are patrolling that area -- helicopter patrols. How far they have ground controls is another question. The frontier seems to be open. It is very easy to cross. But it is very long and very difficult to patrol. On the other hand, guerilla infiltration is very difficult, since it is very open, and although one would march at night, where would one hide during the day? So what does one do during the day? It is very hard to hide your tracks. Tracks are very easily seen. This southern part of eastern Angola is all loose sand right up into Moxico. It is very tiring to walk in, and it has an inch or two of loose gravel soil which is almost sand, and your tracks are very, very visible. Everybody is tracking everybody else. We had a chap ahead of our group looking simply at the ground and seeing the most astonishing things that I never could see. He would say, "Now there's lion, he went that way about three hours ago. That's elephant, all right. Oh, now, that is Portuguese -- but last

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*Marcum, John, The Angolan Revolution, Vol. I, The Anatomy of An Explosion (1950-1962), The M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1969.

**South West Africa People's Organization.

week." Well, they have skilled trackers on both sides, and tracks through the kind of soil within that country can easily be seen from the air, as you know, so I think it is very, very difficult to do this operation. Moreover, the population is scarce up there, and the question of food supply is acutely difficult. I would say that SWAPO is doing very little.

Q: To what extent is the fact that the MPLA's supply area in Zambia is in the Western Province or old Barotseland, which is itself an area of political dissidence within Zambia, a critical situation?

A: Not a real one. You see, the Lozoh hierarchy is organized now against the UNIP*, and its accession of strength was Mundia's general alliance with ANC**. Therefore, it is slightly annoying for the Zambian government that this should be so. But there is absolutely no evidence that I could see -- and I was obliged to spend a week up and down the frontier -- that there was any activity. This is not a popular issue at all. You see, you know Lozoh politics -- the very fact that two years ago the Litunga, the king, the new Litunga came in and he was Godwin Mbikusita Lewanika. Godwin Lewanika used to be a police agent of the British up until the late 1950's. He was well known to be so. And he was a very shrewd chap, who understood the Loz structure, and he worked himself into being Litung . So, therefore, if you are in Lealui or in Mongu, in Lozoh politics, if you were to have to depend upon the Lozoh hierarchy, you would do extremely poorly. But the situation is not evidently like that. And I wouldn't think that there was much problem there at all.

Q: You don't feel that there might be a secessionist movement in conjunction with the Portuguese?

A: Oh, no, the Portuguese had a go at that, but it is so difficult. They would never get away with it.

Q: Where do the Portuguese get their arms and what conditions are there on its supply?

A: The Portuguese make small arms and ammunition, grenades, land mines, one or two rather bad automatics, and small artillery. They don't make any airplanes, they don't make any bombs, they don't make napalm, they don't make automatics of any value, and they don't make large mortars. All this they get from their allies,

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*The United National Independence Party (Zambia).

**African National Congress (Zambia).

and mostly by purchase or on credit. They've got most of their helicopters and aircraft from France and West Germany, but this is really a question of NATO supply. It is really hard to know how it breaks down. The Fiat 91, which they have used extensively in Guinea Bissau -- not, I think, in Angola -- is a middle-sized jet fighter bomber which is a NATO product and was made for NATO. It is now long since obsolete in NATO terms. I think the engine is German, the undercarriage is British, and the airframe is Dutch. Anyway, it is one of those productions with which everybody is concerned. The actual sale was made by Western Germany on highly preferential terms. They sold them a number of them -- about 20. The helicopters come mostly from France and have been Allouettes. Lately, however, they have been getting these Puma ones, which are a kind of NATO cooperative job in which the British, French, Italians, and perhaps Germans are involved. It is made in Belgium as far as I know. There is no ban on any of that and no bar on the Portuguese getting all the supplies they possibly can pay for. And perhaps supplies which they don't have to pay for. Formally there is a bar. All the signatories of NATO place a bar on the scale to Portugal of arms to be used in Africa. But the Portuguese get around it very easily by saying Angola and Mozambique are not in Africa, that they are parts of the "Motherland." And they even say this officially in official statements. It is an awfully silly kind of joke. It does say "Africa," but they say this very seriously and they get away with it. The British recently sold frigates to the Portuguese, which were once again subject to the ban placed by Prime Minister Macmillan in 1961 on British equipment -- that none of it was to be used in Africa. But it is being used in Guinea Bissau, which of course to the Portuguese is part of the "Motherland," is a province of Portugal.

Q: What is the attitude of the guerillas toward Angolans who are captured? I take it from time to time in a brush, they would capture somebody. Do they give them a hard time or do they welcome them and try to convert them?

A: I didn't see any. This didn't happen to me.

Q: Does it happen very often?

A: It does happen, but not too often. Neither side in guerilla wars take many prisoners. But as far as I could tell -- I questioned them on this -- they don't shoot their prisoners, which is what was done in Europe on both sides. These wars are a good deal less savage than the wars we fought in the Second World War. The guerillas attempt to win over the Africans whom they capture. I don't think they have captured any Portuguese soldiers in Angola yet. In Guinea Bissau and

Mozambique they have captured a few, and, generally speaking, they hand them over to the Red Cross, or, any way, bit by bit. I don't mean limb by limb, I mean little groups. That is why there were still prisoners left in Conakry which had been brought across the frontier. They have let out about a dozen, I think, to the Portuguese through the International Red Cross through the Senegalese Red Cross. But usually they don't let them out all at once. And they are to some extent hostages for the lives of their own people captured by the Portuguese. So, there is a tendency to hang on to them. So far as I know, they don't shoot them, and so far as I know, they don't torture them. I have not seen this happen.

Q: This network still remains a mystery to me. I have sort of a mental image of a group getting together at the border and remaining totally isolated, almost traveling in a capsule across the country.

A: I am sorry if you got that impression from what I said. No, you couldn't operate like that. How would you eat? You cross the frontier at point A and you march for X hours until you have reached the first guerilla detachment. There you stay for one or two days or whatever you decide to do.

Q: Is this in a local village?

A: No, this is a bivouac in the woods. It is a completely mobile bivouac in which there are no permanent installations at all, and you are sleeping simply on the ground. And very cold it is, too. However, they put up with the cold over there, in rags, and this is one of their great difficulties. Nearby in the woodlands at certain points, points A, B, and C, will be "kimbos." In these "kimbos," these woodland villages, in short-term bush huts, not beautifully thatched at all, but make-shift huts, will be living groups of villagers who will number between 50 and 200. And you will meet, or not meet, these people according to your own wishes. In any case, you will meet their representatives who will be the local elective village committee of the MPLA, and they will come and meet you. Then you move on to the next camp, so many hours' march in the general direction of where you are going, and you will collect along the way intelligence on what the Portuguese are up to. When you arrive at each detachment the first thing you will find out is what the local tactical situation is. And this you will repeat for as many days as you wish. In all the weeks I was there, and in all the miles I marched, there were only three days on which we didn't do exactly that. Two of those three day were concerned with crossing a road. On both sides of the road the

population has drawn back so that you have got a very long march from the last guerilla unit on one side to the next one on the other. And you may not make it on one day; you may, in fact, have to bivouac without finding anybody. This happened to me both ways on crossing that road. And it also happened on the third day when, for various tactical reasons, we marched through an area of no habitation. But otherwise, it is very much a matter of moving from one contact to the next, each guerilla unit providing the guide who will take you on to the next guerilla unit. So that it is anything but a vacuum. If I gave that impression, it is only because we crossed the ground fairly rapidly. It couldn't really be otherwise if this were going to be effective. One of the tests which I applied is how far is the ground occupied and controlled in points of tactical importance by guerilla units? Secondly, how far do those guerilla units have contact with and rely upon the local populations? The answers to these questions will tell you whether or not the guerilla movement is in effective occupation. And very clearly, the MPLA in that area are in effective occupation. You can compare it very much with the north. In 1968, '69, and '70 at least seven or eight Europeans crossed the northern border and marched with the UPA. They all agree in their descriptions of what they saw. A Swedish man and his wife in 1969, an Austrian at the beginning of 1970, and two Frenchmen in the middle of 1970 all agreed that for about 150 miles, almost as far as the M'Bridge River, there is no population at all. Outside, of course, there is population in a few urban points like São Salvador. Otherwise, there is no population at all. This area has been completely evacuated of people, and it is only when you get beyond that 150 miles that you begin to get into areas where people and guerillas exist. This is not the case, interestingly enough, with Zambia. You find people on the first day's march after crossing the frontier. And you will find them in quite large numbers.

Q: To what would you attribute the lack of success of the guerillas in the northern part of the country?

A: There are two guerilla movements operating there. One is the UPA, headed by Holden Roberto, and the other is the remnants of the old MPLA, plus some reinforcements which were got through with great difficulties in 1967-68. The MPLA say they have about 1500 - 2000 men active in that area and mostly in Cuanza Norte. Holden claims to have upwards of 10,000 in many parts of the country, but the witnesses that I have sited all agree that they have seen several hundred. The MPLA seems to be, according to Portuguese reports -- and Venter's book is very useful on this because Venter went into that area as well as into the east. He was concerned to report the war from the Portu-

guese side. He is totally committed to the Portuguese side -- and he says that the MPLA remains by far the most effective movement in the north. This is confirmed by other Portuguese reports in war-reporting from places like Luticia, which comes out in Luanda. Why, then, has the MPLA succeeded up to a point, but has failed to push into this area? Largely because this whole frontier is denied to them by [General] Mobutu. And they are not able to reinforce from here in the ways that I have described. So they are able only to hold what they have. Now, Holden is a much more serious case from the guerilla point of view because he has access right along the frontier, and he has major support from Mobutu. As far as we know, Mobutu is prepared to give him anything he wants. The reasons why Holden has failed, I think, are partly grounded in the political motivations he has. First of all, the UPA (not to make a long story of this) began as a movement concerned with ethnic politics of the BaKongo people on both sides of the frontier, both in what was the western Belgian Congo then, and in northern Angola, and has not broken out from this ethnic exclusiveness. Secondly, it is very clear that Holden is biding his time hoping to profit from the end of the war. He maintains his little army at barracks in Kinkuzo, which is not far from Thysville. This little army is within the Congo. Holden, himself, as far as we know has not been in Angola since the war began. He went to Leopoldville at the age of two -- he was born in São Salvador. His small army makes little raids. It made one in June across the frontier (in that case, 12 kilometers across the frontier), hits the Portuguese who are along the frontier, and retreats. He is beginning to do this further west now. Otherwise it is an attentiste policy designed, very much like the Chetniks in wartime Yugoslavia, to conserve strength until the war is over, and then to use its strength in order to exert its political domination. Meanwhile, it in fact destroys itself, since it is not able to expand. There is absolutely no sign of expansion at all. I wish there were, but there isn't.

Q: If they would push south very far, then they would hit the coffee area, which in turn would hit the foreign exchange?

A: This is the real test; you put your finger right on it. Because this area is absolutely perfect for guerilla warfare. It is four times easier than in the east. First of all, it is dense forest. Secondly, it is very flat. Thirdly, it is full of people. Fourthly, it has good communications. It couldn't be better. If you wished to find the guerilla area in which we could all go and operate happily and safely, that would be the place to choose. So Holden has the perfect situation. The fact remains that so far as any development of the war is concerned, except in a very minor way, there has been none since 1963.

Q: On the other hand, have not the Portuguese put most of their troops in the north because of the threat to their coffee exports?

A: Yes, in the coffee area this has not been catastrophic. In fact, production has increased. There is absolutely no sign of trouble. Since 1961, when it dropped, coffee production has never ceased to increase and, as you know, 60 - 70% of it comes to the United States. Now, if Holden's movement were any good, he would rapidly have moved into that coffee-growing area. But he hasn't. So one has to reach the conclusion that this movement has failed.

Q: How do you assess the possibilities of Angola overall? If the war becomes more difficult, would the Portuguese attempt to transfer autonomy, if not complete independence, to a white Angolan group, or an Angolan black and white coalition, or to an essentially black Angolan leadership? Could they offer this as a prize to play one tribe off against the other?

A: They have tried, they certainly have tried. For instance, they tried very hard in Mozambique and partially succeeded in detaching the old Makonde leaders from the young Makonde leaders. This was the essence of the split that occurred there in 1968-69. So far as Angola is concerned, they don't seem to have tried very hard. But the test will come when the battle starts in the Ovimbundu area, which it hasn't really started to do yet. The Ovimbundu are the most numerous people, and, so far, they do not seem to have joined either side with much or any enthusiasm.

Q: I thought the Portuguese were pulling most of their conscripts from there?

A: That is not really joining, is it? A conscript scarcely joins. [Black] Angolans are in the army, certainly. A large number of conscripts are undoubtedly Ovimbundu. But so far as can be judged by their behavior, they have no enthusiasm. It is going to be extremely difficult for the Portuguese government to carry through any effective policy of autonomy. My own belief is that the younger ministers in Lisbon would like to do this. They would like to shed these absurd colonial wars, join the common market, modernize Portugal, and get on with it. And I think [Prime Minister] Caetano is a trimmer who sits at the top waiting to see what he can do. But to decolonize is not possible, except in the Rhodesian sense. And that seems unlikely to happen because the settlers cannot possibly carry the situation off. It is manifestly certain that the guerillas cannot be defeated in the absense of the Portuguese army. So the Rhodesian solution, as such,

isn't in the picture, either in Mozambique or in Angola. Unless one supposes that you have an Algerian situation of 1961, in which the government wants to decolonize, wants to make a real devolution of authority, wants to give Angola a genuine measure of self-rule, and bring in Africans. And that the settlers object to this, that part of the army sides with the settlers, and then you have got a sort of OAS situation. That is highly possible. But I tend to think that it will never reach that point since Angola is run by the army, and it is also very powerful in Portugal. My own view is that if the government were to make any real moves towards an autonomy which could lead towards at least a measure of African self-rule, then there would be an army coup and Mr. Nogueira would become the Prime Minister.

Q: Is he the present Portuguese Foreign Minister?

A: No, he was. He is out now. He resigned. And immediately after he resigned, he got a place on the board of the Benguella Railway. As the Benguella Railway is 90% British owned, his appointment explains very much the attitude of the regime. I don't think it is a matter of actual calculation. If Portugal were not in Angola and hadn't the political power, a British-owned railway would have no interest in giving Mr. Nogueira a seat on the board. So there is a direct sense in which the regime clings to these colonies as being decisive for their standard of living. If no real measure of autonomy is in the picture, if the Portuguese cannot continue with the wars for much longer, if they are not winning -- and the evidence that I've suggested to you shows that they are not winning -- then what is the solution? And I must confess, I do not know. If South Africa had a bigger white population, one could imagine a situation in which the South Africans would go in and support the settlers in a Rhodesian-type solution just as they do in Rhodesia. Rhodesia holds up today because it has at least a certain number of South African troops actively engaged infiltrating the Zambezi valley. Without these troops it would seem very doubtful whether large scale guerilla operations could be prevented in Rhodesia. But if you apply that to Angola and Mozambique, it is extremely difficult to see how they would do it. It seems unlikely to me that the Republic of South Africa is militarily in a position to take the place of the Portuguese in Mozambique and Angola, to put into these two countries not fewer than 80,000 troops, and to keep them there for long enough to win these wars. And that will not be a short time. If the Republic of South Africa cannot do that on such a scale, any lesser military intervention isn't going to make much difference. As soon as the Portuguese begin to withdraw, the same thing will happen in Angola, Mozambique, and, of course, Guinea Bissau as has happened elsewhere. The nationalist cause will become immeasurably strengthened. We

have seen this happen in all our [British] colonies, the French saw it in their colonies. Immediately the slide to concessions begins, then all sorts of folk begin to climb on the bandwagon, it starts rolling, the next push is far harder, and it is far harder to resist because you have already given way. Once that starts to happen in Angola and Mozambique, minor military intervention by South Africa will make no difference at all. It has to be major territorial occupation by very large numbers of troups. If that is not possible, then what else is possible? As I see it, in a few years from now the Portuguese will find it impossible to continue these wars. And, at least so far as Angola is concerned, there will then be a tendency to withdraw and a tendency to produce a sort of autonomous government, or fake autonomous government, a kind of 1961 constitution in Rhodesia, so far as that is applicable.

Q: Which would be liberal by previous standards, but not very liberal?

A: Yes. There are a number of Africans today in the senior branches of the Angolan administration. There are at least a dozen senior officials, one whom I think was, until recently, head of the judicial police force and another who is head of the Angolan Department of Education. There is about a dozen men whom they could call upon who could join this administration and give it a sort of African coloring. They already broadcast in African languages on Radio Luanda, thus admitting for the first time the African nature of Angola. For the first time since 1968 they are broadcasting programs of African music on Radio Luanda. It would be possible to imagine around about 1974-75 a sort of semi-autonomy handed out. Not too much, so much that it would outrage the settlers, or the army, and not so little as to appear totally absurd in the eyes of the rest of the world. This is the objective, I am sure, the Portuguese will move towards, but once again, possibly even bringing in Holden, possibly dividing northern Angola and giving it some kind of Lozi-Barotse sovereignty, some kind of local autonomy in which Holden could be Prime Minister of these provinces. That kind of solution is not to be put out of the question. I think they would have adopted it in Capo Delgado if they had had the chance. Now they would be able to dictate a large part of the solution, so one comes to the conclusion that <u>that</u> kind of autonomous solution is not going to be possible.

Q: Might it last a year or two?

A: I wouldn't want to go beyond that. I think there will be about 1975 the most tremendous commotion, the most frightful confusion

in Angola. All sorts of solutions will be tried at the same time, and everybody will be getting in on the act, including [General] Mobutu, who manifestly must have some kind of territorial ambitions on the BaKongo ethnic part of Angola.

Q: I discussed this once with President Kasavubu, who felt that the BaKongo people were a nation in the 13th - 14th centuries, so why shouldn't they be a nation again? The Belgians were only there a short 75 years, so why not reconstitute the nation on both sides of the border? They don't say as much about Congo-Brazza, now, but I think they include that in their Congo thinking.

A: I believe that Holden is in agreement with Mobutu on this. Both of them think that the Kongo, the BaKongo, should be united in an autonomous state within the Republic of Congo. This is my view as to what agreement they arrived at. But, of course, it may well be that, depending on the Portuguese situation, Holden will see himself as possibly being the recipient of a measure of power for all of Angola. There is definitely going to be a great deal of confusion and destruction and muddle.

Q: Did you say that MPLA controlled the railroad east of Luso?

A: Well, to the extent of preventing traffic east of Luso. They could, but they don't, break the line.

Q: Does that railroad actually go into the Congo?

A: No, and they don't prevent traffic on the railway, but they could. It comes down to where they could prevent traffic on the road.

Q: But a lot of that traffic is Zambian copper, isn't it?

A: Yes.

Q: A couple of years ago they came in from the Congo, if I understand correctly, and they cut the road, and then they went into Zambia. The Portuguese repaired the line within about 24 hours, but they announced about a week's stoppage in the shipment of copper. They kept saying what a terrible situation it was. Zambia said, "You have repaired the railway, we want to ship the copper," but the Portuguese answered, "Sorry, we can't." It seemed to be a gamesmanship between them.

A: That's right. Anyway, the MPLA does not stop railway stock, but they could since they have by all accounts, whether on one side or the other, stopped the road traffic on routes out of Luso.

Q: How much do the Portuguese get out of allowing Zambians to use that railway?

A: I don't know.

Q: If it were a sufficient lever, Zambia, if forced, could dry up that border pretty well.

A: Yes, if it wanted to.

Q: Then why haven't they acted before now?

A: It is in the interests of Kaunda's government that these movements succeed. Because in the measure that these movements should succeed the pressure against Zambia falls off.

Q: From the Portuguese point of view in Angola, it would be good for them to put the pressure on Zambia, have some major calamity shut down the line. Any pressure on Zambia would mean more pressure on the guerillas, would it not?

A: Yes. But the copper isn't only a concern to Zambia. There are other important countries in the world, including our own, which are interested in copper. Everything holds together.

Q: In other words, there is going to be outside pressure on the Portuguese not to break the line?

A: I don't know this, but I must infer it.

Q: Isn't the British ownership of the Benguella Railway largely concentrated in the Tory Party, which is a small but potent lobby within the councils, I should think?

A: The Benguella Railway is 90% owned by Tanganyika concessions, which is 33% owned in this country and the rest is owned by interests mostly in London. The Portuguese are not acting in isolation any more than the Africans are. The Africans are playing for support. They would like to get support for these guerilla movements from the west very much, because they don't like relying on the Russians, or whoever it may be. They are realistic people. They

know they live in Africa, and they know the policy line from one side in the long run isiimpossible for them. Their attempt is to be non-aligned. They put great effort into this, and so far, they have failed completely.

Q: Have you heard any statements from Gulf Oil recently? Don't you think they are certainly concerned in this problem?

A: Gulf is interested mainly in Cabinda and in Cabinda the guerilla activity has fallen off considerably. Nothing much is now going on in Cabinda.* Some company -- I'm not sure if it is Gulf -- is interested in mineral oil in Guinea Bissau. They haven't started drilling yet, though they have a concession to drill.

*Crude oil -- amounting to 375, 972 tons -- produced in Angola's northern enclave of Cabinda was exported by the Cabinda Gulf Oil Company, a subsidiary of the Gulf Oil Corporation, during February this year to refineries in metropolitan Portugal, France, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, U.S. and Japan. According to recently published statistics, it is estimated that Cabinda oil exports will reach 5 million tons by the end of the year. (Source: Luanda Radio, 22 March, 1971)

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